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Panel II: Digital Video 
Moderator: Yochai Benkler∗ 
Panelists: Andrew Appel∗∗  
   Jeffrey Cunard∗∗∗ 
   Martin Garbus∗∗∗∗ 
   Edward Hernstadt∗∗∗∗∗ 
   E. Leonard Rubin∗∗∗∗∗∗ 
   Charles Sims∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 
 
MR. PENNISI:  We will now begin our second panel: whether 
copyright laws may be construed to restrict the unlicensed digital 
transfer of video, and how such transfers may be or should be 
regulated. 
As with Panel I, this panel discussion will be preceded by five 
minutes of remarks by each panelist and followed by fifteen minutes 
of questions by the audience. 
Our Digital Video Panel today includes  and this is 
alphabetically by firm: 
Jeffrey Cunard is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of 
Debevoise & Plimpton.  He practices in the areas of intellectual 
property, information technology, and telecommunications.  His 
 
 ∗  Director of the Information Law Institute, Faculty Co-Director of JSD Program; 
Associate Professor, New York University School of Law.  Tel-Aviv University Faculty of 
Law, L.L.B. 1991; Harvard Law School, J.D. 1994. 
 ∗∗  Professor of Computer Science, Princeton University.  Princeton University, A.B. 
1981;  Carnegie-Mellon University, Ph.D. 1985. 
 ∗∗∗  Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton.  University of California at Los Angeles, B.A. 1977;  
Yale Law School, J.D. 1980. 
 ∗∗∗∗  Founding Partner, Frankfurt Garbus Kurnit Klein & Selz.  Hunter College, B.A. 
1955; New York University, J.D. 1959. 
 ∗∗∗∗∗  Associate, Frankfurt Garbus Kurnit Klein & Selz.  Columbia University, B.A. 1982;  
University of Pennsylvania, J.D. 1991. 
∗∗∗∗∗∗  Partner, Gordon & Glickson LLC; Adjunct Professor, Loyola University School of 
Law; Adjunct Professor, John Marshall Law School.  University of Illinois and University 
of Miami, A.B. 1956;  University of Miami, J.D. 1959. 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  Partner, Proskauer Rose LLP.  Amherst College, B.A. 1971;  Yale Law School, J.D. 
1976. 
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most recent engagements include rendering advice on a wide range 
of digital media, intellectual property (IP), electronic commerce, 
and other matters relating to the use of the Internet.  Mr. Cunard 
represents companies interested in the availability of music and 
motion pictures in new digital media, as well as providers of online 
services and companies on computer software-related matters. He 
helps both vendors and customers in structuring, drafting, and 
resolving disputes involved in computer software development, 
licensing arrangements, and outsourcing transactions. 
Martin Garbus is a founding partner of Frankfurt, Garbus, Klein & 
Selz.  Mr. Garbus has represented major book publishers, movie 
companies, and media conglomerates in the United States and abroad 
in commercial and media actions, as well as major new media 
entities, Internet companies, networks, and cable television and radio 
industries.  As part of his communications and IP practices, he has 
represented Salman Rushdies publishers; actors, including Spike 
Lee, Al Pacino, Richard Gere, and Robert Redford; and well-known 
political dissidents, such as Vaclav Havel, Nelson Mandela, and 
Anatoly Sakharov.  Mr. Garbus has also served as a consultant on 
media and communications in Canada, England, Australia, and the 
former Soviet Union.  Mr. Garbus was lead counsel on behalf of 
2600 Magazine in a DeCSS1 case tried this past summer before the 
Southern District.2 
Edward Hernstadt is an associate at Frankfurt, Garbus, Kein & 
Selz and focuses on media and the First Amendment, 
discrimination/Title VII law, including civil litigation, entertainment 
litigation, and IP law.  Along with Mr. Garbus, Mr. Hernstadt 
litigated on behalf of 2600 Magazine against the Motion Picture 
Association of America.3 
Leonard Rubin is a partner with the Chicago firm of Gordon & 
Glickson, which concentrates its practice in information technology 
 
 1 DeCSS is a software utility that descrambles the CSS (an acronym for Content 
Scramble System) copy protection system; see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 
82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) [herinafter Reimerdes I]. 
 2 See generally Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) [hereinafter Reimerdes II]. 
 3 See id. 
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and related fields.  Mr. Rubin, who specializes in copyright, 
trademark, trade secret, and entertainment law, is the former general 
counsel for Playboy Enterprises.  He has extensive experience 
handling negotiations, legal problems, Internet implications, and trial 
and appellate litigation in the communications, publishing, computer, 
music, television, theatrical, and motion picture practice areas.  Mr. 
Rubin is presently an adjunct professor at Loyola University School 
of Law and John Marshall Law School. 
Yochai Benkler is an associate professor at the New York 
University School of Law.  He is the director of the Information Law 
Institute and faculty co-director of the JSD program.  Professor 
Benkler teaches information law and policy in the digital 
environment, communications law, and property law.  His research 
focuses on the effects of laws which regulate information production 
and dissemination on the distribution of control over information 
flows, knowledge, and cultural production in the digital environment.  
He has written about rules governing infrastructure, such as 
telecommunications and broadcast law, as well as rules governing 
private control over information, such as IP, privacy, e-commerce, 
and constitutional law. 
Andrew Appel is a tenured professor of computer science at 
Princeton University, where he has been a member of the faculty 
since receiving his doctorate at Carnegie Mellon University.  
Professor Appels research focuses on computer security, compilers, 
programming languages, type theory, and functional programming.  
He recently provided expert testimony in the landmark case against 
2600 Magazine4 for violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA).5 
Leon Gold could not be here today due to an emergency 
deposition, and Charles Sims will be standing in for him.  As you 
might remember from the first panel, Mr. Sims is a partner in the 
Litigation and Dispute Resolution Departments of Proskauer Rose, 
where he concentrates on copyright and First Amendment issues.  He 
 
 4 See Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 294. 
 5 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
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has worked on matters for the publishing, motion picture, and music 
industries.  He was one of Proskauers lead counsel in the DVD6 
DeCSS case tried this summer.7 
I will give the floor to Professor Benkler. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  I would like to use these few minutes 
not so much to present a position but rather to describe what I think 
would be worthwhile for us to talk about and ask of the panelists. 
First, the combination of thinking about video as a category is one 
way of slicing this.  Another is to say that we have quite distinct 
policy issues on the table before us.  One of them, primarily raised 
by the DMCA, has to do with the protection of encryption as a means 
of either preserving or extending the rights of copyright owners, and 
whether such activity is sensible, or even constitutional, in the digital 
context. 
I would urge the panelists to consider  if not during their first 
comments, to at least focus on this in the questions and answers  
not so much what one would argue to a judge but instead what one 
would argue to a legislature: what is a sensible thing to do, and ought 
we to think about these problems? 
iCraveTV involves more traditional copyright issues  though we 
may also focus on the technology issues.8  iCraveTV also involves 
the question of retransmission and how Internet retransmission fits 
into our more general law  focused, I presume, primarily on the 
broadcast, cable, and satellite relationship  of retransmission by 
one set of media players of content that is transmitted via broadcast 
and generally freely available to the public.9 
 
 
 6 Digital versatile disks (DVDs) contain copies of the motion pictures in digital 
form.  They protect those motion pictures from copying by using an encryption system 
called CSS.  CSS-protected motion pictures on DVDs may be viewed only on players and 
computer drives equipped with licensed technology that permits the devices to decrypt and 
play - but not to copy - the films.  See Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 303. 
 7 See id. 
 8 See National Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1831 
(W.D. Pa. 2000). 
 9 See id. 
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So these are the issues in general.  I think they ought to raise the 
same set of issues that we talked about this morning: 
● The need for protection  is protection really needed? 
● The particular attributes of the protection  just as we spoke 
about this morning, whether the protection is misappropriation 
or a sui generis right; whether it is this particular kind of 
technology protection or a different kind of technology 
protection.  And so there is the need for protection, particularly 
the design of the rules used to achieve that protection and to 
serve that need. 
● The institutional limitations on achieving that goal  what are 
these institutional limitations?  How much does the Constitution 
allow?  In this case, it is more about the First Amendment than it 
was when we spoke this morning with respect to the Intellectual 
Property Clause.10  Additionally, to what extent does the 
Constitution permit the institutional solution that the DMCA 
represents? 
● And finally, the costs  or, rather, the needs and the costs are 
all rolled into the constraints.  Why refrain from regulation, 
assuming there is a need?  What might be the concerns we 
would have about over-protection?  Is there such an animal in 
this case as over-protection?  What are the potential social costs 
we might worry about when we, for example, prohibit 
circumvention of copyright protection mechanisms? 
So, these are the questions that I think are worthwhile having in 
our minds as we go through the panel presentations. 
Largely based on a sense of what people will say initially and 
where they stand, we might jumble the order a little bit relative to the 
order on the board with roughly everyones consent.  If you do not, 




 10 See U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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MR. GARBUS:  Professor Benkler was one of my teachers.  He is 
one of the people who submitted a wonderful amicus brief in the 
Universal case,11 and he taught me a good deal about the law in this 
case.  Professor Appel, on the other hand, as one of the chief 
witnesses in the case, taught us all a good deal about the technology. 
One of the interesting issues about this is: who is responsible for 
defining the balance between copyright and the First Amendment?  If 
you read the legislative history of the DMCA, there is no question 
but that the copyright holders prevail over scholars, librarians, and 
other people who are very much interested in fair use.12 
The next question is: assuming that this was done by Congress  
or assuming that this is the place where the power of money, i.e., the 
power of copyright holders, is to be felt  what is the role of the 
courts in evaluating what Congress has done?  The question is: how 
do the courts approach it, what are the various First Amendment 
tests, and what are the various policy tests that are used? 
I will just read you a few words from Judge Kaplans opinion, 
because I think it articulates a view that many people espouse, as 
many courts certainly do.  He said, when we raised the issue of fair 
use and the First Amendment, that access control measures, such as 
CSS, do involve some risk of preventing lawful as well as unlawful 
uses of copyright material.  Congress, however, clearly faced up to 
and dealt with this question in enacting the DMCA.13 
In other words, it is absolutely clear that lawful uses of 
copyrighted material are being banned for the first time.  Whether 
you call the statute a copyright statute, a para-copyright statute, 
or something else, it is called the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
so clearly it has very heavy copyright implications.14 
 
 
 11 See generally Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 294. 
 12 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-796, at 75 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 
652. 
 13 See Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 328-330; see also Reimerdes I, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 
219-20 (S.D.N.Y 2000). 
 14 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). 
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One of the questions you deal with in the law is whether there are 
less restrictive means of dealing with the same problem than 
stopping free speech?  You have criminal penalties, and a whole 
body of law which deals with contributory infringement.  In other 
words, prior to this time, it is not that the copyright holders were 
helpless.  There are other ways in which copyright holders could 
protect their interest.  So the idea that if you do not have this statute 
the world is going to fall apart, or that copyright holders will be 
without any protection, is a little too simplistic, I think. 
One of the things that this statute15 does, for example, if I wanted 
to make a DVD or something else with public domain material and 
they put on CSS,16 that would stop public domain material from 
being available to the public, for the first time.  If I were a 14th-
century scholar at Fordham, and I wanted to have access to new 
books and libraries that have e-books with CSS controls or 
something like that, I would not be able to do that any longer.  In 
other words, what this statute says basically is these are the things 
you cannot do.17 
But then, they make certain exceptions for certain people who can 
do these things, and what it ultimately becomes is kind of a licensing 
statute.18  For the first time, you have to ask permission from people. 
So basically, I think the way this question is framed, it is clear that 
in Harper & Row the court attempted to strike a balance between 
copyright law and First Amendment law.19  It is clear that this statute 
disregards that balance.20  Whether or not the statute can disregard 
the balance; whether in fact Congress can appropriately say that we 
overrule Sony v. Betamax;21 whether the MPA22 can go before 
Congress and other copyright holders and say fair use is still 
protected, fair use is still protected. There are many congressmen 
 
 15  See id. 
 16  See supra note 1. 
 17  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
 18  See id.   
 19 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1984). 
 20  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
 21 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 22  Motion Picture Association. 
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who in the debates talked about how fair use is protected,23 and the 
statute even has some language about fair use being protected.24  
Nonetheless, what this court decided  and it may be upheld by a 
higher court, or it may not  is that fair use is effectively banned.25 
We also had testimony in the Universal City Studios case, not 
surprisingly, that videos are on the way out.26  Pretty soon it will all 
be DVDs.  For those of you who have been following the e-book 
market, most publishers are projecting that within six or seven years 
at least half the market will be e-books at $3.95 or something, and 
then the hardcover books will be $70 or something like that for the 
more selective consumer.27  So within a period of time, everything 
will be under a process similar to this. 
Now, Professor Felton, Professor Appels colleague at Princeton, 
said in the case that with the release of DeCSS,28 ultimately the DVD 
will have to change its security system because certain kinds of 
people will break it.  It may even make DVD hardware valueless.  So 
he says, I have an obligation to tell the consumers what is out there 
 
 23  See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551 (II), at 25-6 (1998). 
 24  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
 25 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 579.  In his dissent, Justice Brennan, with whom 
Justice White and Justice Marshall joined, stated: 
Although the Court pursues the laudable goal of protecting the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas, . . . this zealous defense of the 
copyright owners prerogative will, I fear, stifle the broad dissemination of 
ideas and information copyright is intended to nurture.  Protection of the 
copyright owners economic interest is achieved in this case through an 
exceedingly narrow definition of the scope of fair use.  The progress of arts 
and sciences and the robust public debate essential to an enlightened citizenry 
are ill served by this constricted reading of the fair use doctrine. 
Id.,  see also Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322, 324. 
 26 See Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 310, 337 ([E]ven if movies were available only 
on DVDs, as some day may be the case . . . .). 
 27  See generally Paula J. Hane, E-Publishing Competition Heats Up; Traditional 
Booksellers get into the Game, INFO. TODAY, No. 2, Vol. 18, Pg. 32 (2001) (stating that 
Barnes & Noble Digital is offering readers low prices for e-books (from $5.95 to $7.95), 
which, until now, is quite a bit lower than other e-book pricing.  The reference and textbook 
publishing fields have seen a flurry of digital publishing initiatives and partnerships.  The 
textbook area, in particular, is considered to be a key point for development and growth of 
e-books.). 
 28 See Reimerdes II, 111 F.Supp. 2d at 311, 315. 
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so that they can know what to do.29 
In talking to his class, for example, he can talk about DeCSS. 
Jane Ginsburg, a law professor at Columbia, refers to a URL site 
which has DeCSS.  So it is clear that DeCSS is permitted for some 
people; it is not permitted for others.  In this case, it was a journalist.  
You will have to read the decision to go deeper.30 
It seems clear to me that the New York Times can write about this 
case, claim that people say that it is a way of getting free movies, say 
that there is a group of people who even advocate getting free 
movies, talk about open source, and refer to the site.  It seems to me 
that the Times ought not  and cannot  be punished for that.  
Nonetheless, thus far in this case, the journalist  whose history is 
different, yet remains a journalist has been punished for that. 
So I think these are very profound issues. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  Ed Hernstadt will go next. 
MR. HERNSTADT:  I worked with Marty on this case, so first I 
have to say that I agree with everything Marty said. 
The question as framed does pose certain problems, because the 
real answer is that copyright laws already restrict the unlicensed 
transfer, use, and rebroadcast of video works.  Any use, transfer, or 
rebroadcast of a video work  whether its digital or not  that 
constitutes copyright infringement is restricted. It is illegal. 
The real question is: does the DMCA add something else to this?  
It does.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act has nothing to do 
with copyright infringement  even though, as Marty pointed out, it 
has the word copyright in it and it has a lot to do with copyright.  It 
 
 29 See generally id. at 294. 
 30 See generally id. at 338.  The court stated that: 
Many of the possible fair uses may be made without circumventing CSS while 
others, i.e., those requiring copying, may not. Hence, the question whether 
Section 1201(a)(2) as applied here substantially affects rights, much less 
constitutionally protected rights, of members of the fair use community 
cannot be decided in bloc, without consideration of the circumstances of each 
member or similarly situated groups of members.). 
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is § 1201 of the Copyright Act.31  The DMCA is only about access to 
copyrighted materials that have been stored in a digital format.  
Section 1201(a)(1) is using some kind of a technological measure to 
get around a protective device, such as CSS, that protects the 
digitally stored copyrighted material.32 
Our case, the Universal City Studios case, was about making 
technologies available that would permit you to circumvent some 
kind of technological measure.33 
It is a lot of words, but basically it means that you could take a 
DVD, which is just a storage device, put a movie on it, tie a piece of 
string around it, and you have got some kind of a technological 
measure.34  A technological measure is defined in the Act as 
something that requires a process to get around.35 So, if you have to 
untie a string, there is arguably a process there. Effectively, that is 
what it is. 
Suddenly, that copyrighted material is different than any other 
copyrighted material in the world, and in the history of the world  
books, CDs, videocassettes, stone tablets, words written in sand.  It is 
the only time that you have no right.36  Youthe public and anyone 
other than the author (if the author has signed the rights over to a 
distributor)  have no right to access copyrighted material without 
some kind of permission.37 
The limits, the restrictions on copyrighted material today, are set 
forth very clearly in the Copyright Act.38  Fair use is permitted.39  A 
number of uses are permitted.40  Those uses, as Marty mentioned, 
 
 31  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994 Supp. IV). 
 32 See id. 
 33 See Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 294. 
 34 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998). 
 35 See id. § 1201 (a)(3)(A). 
 36 See generally David Nimmer, A Riff On Fair Use In The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 674-86 (2000). 
 37 See id. at 718-19. 
 38 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-112 (1994). 
 39 See id. § 107. 
 40 See id. §§ 108-112.  (some of these rights include: reproduction by libraries and 
archives (§ 108); exemption of certain performances and displays (§ 110) and; Ephemeral 
Recordings (§ 112)). 
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under the DMCA have disappeared.  There is no such thing as fair 
use or any of the related things, like reverse-engineering41 or 
encryption.42  None of that stuff exists if copyrighted material is 
stored digitally and some kind of circumvention device is put around 
it. 
What are the costs?  You could have a situation where someone 
prevails in a lawsuit where they are sued for copyright infringement 
and for violating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  They could 
win by presenting a full fair use defense and they could defeat the 
copyright infringement claim, but they can still lose on the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act claim.  That does not make any sense. 
One of the biggest problems concerning how the Act is written is 
contained in this question: does it restrict the unlicensed transfer, use, 
or rebroadcast?  That presumes that a license is required for all use.  
Under the existing regimen, it is only required for certain types of 
uses.43  That distinction has been wiped out. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  Chuck? 
MR. SIMS:  Needless to say, Ed agrees with Marty, and I disagree 
with both of them on almost every point, and Judge Kaplan agreed 
with us.44 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  Are you suggesting his views are more 
relevant? 
MR. SIMS:  No, they are tentative, but they are  what is the 
phrase  they are infallible because they are final, or something?  
They are not final, but we will get there. 
 
 
 41 Reverse engineering of software is determining how a specific software program 
operates by working backward from a finished program. See Terril Lewis, Reverse 
Engineering Of Software: An Assessment Of The Legality Of Intermediate Copying, 20 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L.J. 561, 562 (2000). 
 42  Encryption technology is defined as the means of scrambling and descrambling of 
information using mathematical formulas or algorithms.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(1)(B) 
(2000). 
 43  See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 109-122 (1994). 
 44 See Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321-24. 
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I want to focus on the questions you raised, Yochai, because I 
think they are a better way of going through this: first, the need for 
protection; second, what kind of protection, if there is a need for 
some; and third, whether the Constitution permits it. 
Ed described, in a horrified tone, the technology which prevents 
access to books, to First Amendment materials, and prevents us from 
getting at them and using them when and where we want. Isnt this a 
horrible thing?  He was really describing the lock on the front door 
of the New York Public Library at 42nd Street, and that really is a 
model for what Congress did. 
Why did Congress pass this statute, notwithstanding the continuing 
existence of the copyright law?  Well, Congress did so essentially to 
avoid, on behalf of content owners who were willing to invest in 
technological protection, precisely what has happened to the record 
and song-writing industry.45  Yes, there is a copyright law, and it is 
largely difficult, if not useless, for record owners in a world of 
Gnutella.46  What Congress concluded, after extensive hearings, is 
that the risks of perfect digital copies were different in kind from 
anything that we have faced before.47 
Yes, VHS piracy does exist and there are VHS pirate factories in 
southeast Asia.48  And the MPAA49 spent a lot of money on street 
corners, near the bus station, and in towns around America dealing 
with analog VHS piracy.50  But every copy that is made is degraded 
from the first one, and so those rights have been deemed to be 
manageable with continuing investments. 
But, Congress concluded that digital piracy would be different 
because, with one push of one button, you can make available to 20 
or 80 million people worldwide, a song or a movie  any kind of 
 
 45 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551 (II) at § 107(a) (1998). 
 46 Gnutella is a fully-distributed information sharing technology.  See Gnutella at 
http://www.gnutellanet.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2001). 
 47 See S. REP. NO. 105-190 at 65, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
 48  See Jane Moir, Hong Kong Praised for Taking Right Path in Battle Against Copyright 
Crime, S. CHINA MORNING POST, September 21, 2000 at 3. 
 49 Motion Picture Association of America. 
 50 See Ernest Plock & John E. Siegmund, Entertainment; 1991 U.S. Industrial Outlook, 
U.S. Dept. Commerce. (1991). 
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content.  Congress concluded that copyright has protected incentives 
to creation, and that those incentives are now in jeopardy because of 
the dangers posed by instantaneous digital copying. So, Congress 
said, they are entitled to protection.51 
What kind of protection did Congress give?  Essentially it is the 
protection of locks and keys.  Content owners are allowed to put 
locks around their property  that is, encryption  and they are 
entitled to have people not provide openly to the public the 
decryption utilities.52 
The analogy, which either the court used or was presented to the 
judge  and I believe moved him  was: Look, General Motors has 
a fleet of automobiles out there, and there are lots of different keys, 
but there is a master key that works for the whole fleet.  Congress or 
state legislatures can make it unlawful for somebody to take that key 
and provide it, or provide information about it, to the whole world.  
If the lock on the front door of the Metropolitan Museum (the Met) 
were a numerical code rather than a physical bronze key, it would 
not matter  the government could protect the proprietors of the 
Metropolitan Museum and keep people from going in there at will, 
even though there is enormous First Amendment value to all the 
materials that are in there.53 
So, Congress essentially said, given this huge risk that content 
owners face and our job of protecting incentives to creation, we are 
going to allow them to provide encryption.54  We are going to make 
it improper  unlawful, I suppose  to provide those to the public.  
That is what Congress did. 
Does the Constitution prevent Congress from doing that?  I think 
no more than it prevents Congress or a state legislature from making 
it unlawful to open the front door of the Met or to break down the 
door of the Met.  It is an additional crime if you go in and steal a 
painting, but you have committed a crime in the first place if you 
merely break open the door or, assuming that it is a numerical code 
 
 51 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 105-551 (II), 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) 
 52  See generally  17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). 
 53 Reimerdes I, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 226. 
 54  See supra note 52. 
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which is protected by the First Amendment, if you provide that code 
to the public.  What you have done is you have risked, you have 
jeopardized, important First Amendment materials.  If owners cannot 
protect those, there will be fewer for everybody.  That, at any rate, 
was what Congress concluded, and I do not think that anything in the 
First Amendment says that they could not. 
Now, I just want to address a few of the comments that have been 
made, because I do think that it is important to correct them. 
Marty referred to this poor journalist who has been punished.  
Well, there is no punishment out there.  This is a case for an 
injunction, and he has been enjoined from providing to the public 
this decryption utility. 
One of the more interesting things that I have actually seen, by 
way of interviews lately, was one of Stephen King, where he was 
describing his first go-around when he and his publishers put a book 
online for a very small price  I think it was $2.00 or $2.50  and 
he said what amazed them was that they could see, on the computer 
traffic, that there were hackers around the country who were 
spending upwards of 40 to 48 hours trying to break the technologic 
protection, the encryption utility.  He said, Look, this is totally 
uneconomical for them to do.  The thing costs $2.50.  Whose time 
could be worth 40 hours?55 
But, they wanted to break it because it was there. People all around 
this country, and I am sure all around the world, feel that way. 
Congress acted to protect content owners from exactly those kinds of 
people.  I believe Judge Kaplan found that the defendant in this case 
was that sort of person.56 
Now finally, let me address fair use, because the suggestion has 
been made here that this law does not permit fair use.  I submit that 
 
 55 See Stephen King Discusses His Latest Book, The Plant, and His Plan For Selling 
It Over the Internet, Today: NBC television broadcast (July 24, 2000). 
 56 See Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (Defendants, on the other hand, are 
adherents of a movement that believes that information should be available without charge 
to anyone clever enough to break into the computer systems or data storage media in which 
it is located.). 
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that is a preposterous proposition and one that has no meaning.  
Whether it will have meaning ten years from now, or five years from 
now, who knows?  Judge Kaplan said, when and if that happens, let 
me know.57 
 But there was a submission, which I think really focuses on 
the quality of this point, by a professor of law at the Harvard Law 
School, who said, This law violates my First Amendment rights and 
prevents me from exercising fair use because I teach trial advocacy, 
trial practice, and I need to be able to use these great scenes in 
movies like THE VERDICT, and this law violates my First Amendment 
right to do so. 
I think the answer to that professor  and to anybody else, at least 
now, who goes down this road  is that it does not.  You can take 
the VHS, you can bring the DVD and a $299  last Christmas, 
probably cheaper this Christmas  video player into your classroom 
and play whatever clips you want of this movie.  You can criticize it 
to your hearts content. 
I grew up in a time before there were VCRs.  The fact was that, to 
exercise fair use with respect to a movie, I had to go see the movie 
and wait until it came around.  And if it was CINDERELLA, which 
Disney only released every five years, I would have to wait five 
years.  That was not a violation of my First Amendment rights, and it 
did not deprive me of fair use. 
The fact is that now, and for the foreseeable future, any content 
that is on a DVD is subject to whatever § 107 of the Copyright Act 
says: criticism for purposes of scholarship, analysis, whatever  all 
of the things you can do by way of fair use  you can do with 
respect to DVDs.58 
What you cannot do is make a perfect digital copy unless you have 
permission to do that.  When presented with the interest in making 
perfect digital copies, as opposed to analog ones, the interests of 
those users, weighed against the harms to the continued incentives 
for the creation of material, were simply balanced in a particular way 
 
 57 See id. at 323. 
 58  See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
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that Congress chose.  And that is Congresss power under our 
system. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  Andrew Appel? 
PROFESSOR APPEL:  Well, I do want to talk about fair use.  I 
am all for promoting the progress of science and useful arts by 
securing certain rights to authors and inventors. But the copyright 
law has long recognized that the progress of science and the political 
health of a free society is served by permitting readers to use, 
analyze, criticize, and quote works of literature and video without a 
license.59  To publish or rebroadcast a copyright work, I need a 
license, but not to make a fair use. 
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, although they 
were motivated by the goal of preventing the illegitimate rebroadcast 
of video works, sort of throw out too many babies with the 
bathwater.  It restricts freedom of speech by preventing computer 
scientists from communicating ideas about computer programming.  
And specifically in the area of computer security, if there are security 
systems that we find in our research to be insecure, we like to publish 
the explanation.  This leads to progress in the design of security 
systems. 
Judge Kaplans ruling effectively censors a certain kind of 
discussion of security mechanisms.60  It prevents purchasers of 
videos from playing them on the equipment of their choice.61  And 
there may be all sorts of reasons to have different kinds of equipment 
for playing videos.  If I am a professor and I want to quote a scene in 
a class, there are much better ways than dragging in a TV.  I may 
want to have it integrated in some way with my PowerPoint 
presentation.  So it sort of hinders fair use. 
Other purchasers who want to play the movie on the equipment of 
their choice may not want to buy a certain kind of DVD player or 
software.  This sort of ties the distribution industry to the content 
industry a little too closely. 
 
 59  See id.  
 60 See Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 346. 
 61 See id. 
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But then, the two things I want to talk about in more depth are new 
kinds of fair uses and the notion of the licensing of fair use. 
If I click through a license agreement on my way to seeing some 
future DVD, and the license agreement says I will submit any 
criticism of this movie to the publicity department of Universal 
Studios, this seems to be permitted under the DMCA.  But I do not 
think it conforms to the values we expect in a democratic society. 
I talked about analysis of movies.  There are technological means 
of analyzing movies that may be increasingly important in the future.  
If I am a public health researcher and I have a video library of lots of 
old Hollywood movies, and I want to look for scenes with cigarettes 
in them, I can hire an assistant to watch hundreds of hours of movies, 
but maybe I would like to have a computer program watch the 
movies for me and just pick out the scenes where there might be 
cigarettes.  To do this the computer program needs access to the 
unencrypted content of the movie.  I need to circumvent the 
protection mechanism.  The protection mechanism says that I can 
play it on a DVD player and send it to the screen, but I cannot 
subject the content of the movie to automated analysis. 
A basketball coach may want to find all the times in the 
opponents last ten games where jersey number 81 drops the ball.  Or 
there may be some scene in a video that I believe is faked, and I want 
to examine the motion of the objects to see whether it conforms to 
the laws of physics so I can make an automated analysis. But that 
cannot be done accurately without access to the digital, unencrypted 
form. 
So these technological protection mechanisms artificially inhibit 
many kinds of fair uses.  And I do not think the idea that you can 
drag a TV set somewhere and show the movie is really related to 
those fair uses. 
Now, a lot of the technological analyses that I have described are 
not really mature, but there really are researchers working on video 
content analysis or object-based video coding. They need access to 
the videos to develop these analyses so that the public health 
researchers and the basketball coaches can use them. 
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When they write to the movie studios for a license to get digital 
works, the movie studios are generally unresponsive. I know this 
from talking to the scientists. 
And finally, they should not need a license for this kind of access.  
The DMCA is sending us down the road of needing licenses to 
analyze and criticize the works of others. 
MR. RUBIN:  I am having a little problem discerning whether we 
are talking about what the law is, or what the law should be.  I think 
our discussion has focused so far on what the law should be, and not 
what it is. 
I also have the feeling that the debate that we are having this 
afternoon and that we had this morning probably tracks, to at least 
some degree, the debate that Congress had before passing the 
DMCA. 
One of the problems with laws like the DMCA is that legislators 
are not techies, and techies are not legislators.  Of course, every 
attempt by legislators to predict what is going to happen down the 
line in connection with the development of technology is going to be 
uninformed, at least to the degree that the legislators are going to 
have to be educated.  The education process is not going to be 
anywhere near as deep as the techies education that is brought to 
that particular process. 
There has always been a war between technology and legislation.62  
It goes way back to the 1909 Copyright Act63 and the failure of 
Congress in those days to predict what was going to happen with the 
record industry, the consequent interpretations of the courts of what 
Congress meant by that Act, and the development of records 
 
 62 See, e.g., Richard D. Marks, Communications Symposium: High Technology 
Legislation as an Eighteenth Century Process: Does Congress have the Capacity to 
Legislate Effectively in any Area of Technology that is Complex and Fast-Moving, 6 STAN. 
L. & POLY REV. 17 (1994). 
 63 1909 Copyright Act, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652 (1947) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 407, 410 (2000)). 
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afterwards.64 
The Copyright Office, I believe filed an amicus brief supporting 
the theory that the Audio Home Recording Act of 199265 does not 
immunize Napster from liability for contributory copyright 
infringement.66  But, on the other hand, a member of Congress has 
written the Ninth Circuit saying, this brief does not necessarily 
reflect Congress view67  a little confusing. 
The missing equation from this discussions point of view  and 
maybe it should be missing  is the motivation, because I have yet 
to see in any of these cases a motivation on the part of the allegedly 
infringing conduct to somehow challenge the law.  There has always 
been, it seems to me, a different motivation  whether the 
motivation was eventual profit or just to try to defeat the technology 
because it is there.  It does not seem as though the original 
motivation was to say the DMCA or other copyright laws are 
somehow wrong. 
Maybe they are, because I do not think anyone on this panel today, 
this morning or this afternoon, will dispute the right of artists to be 
compensated for their creative efforts for a limited period of time.  I 
think that is a concept that is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence. 
The question then becomes: how do you balance that right against 
other rights guaranteed by the Constitution, including the First 
Amendment?  I do not hear anything in the way of enforcement of 
 
 64 See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright And New-Use Technologies, 23 NOVA L. 
REV. 657, 660-61 (1999). 
 65  See The Audio Home Recording Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1999)). 
 66 See Govt.s Napster Brief Raises Questions on DMCAs Future, VIDEO WEEK, Sept. 
18, 2000  (The U.S. Copyright Offices amicus brief challenged Napsters argument that the 
Audio Home Recording Act, by shielding its users from liability, makes Napster incapable 
of being a contributory copyright infringer.). 
 67 See David McGuire, Sen. Hatch Refuses to Endorse DOJs Napster Stance, 
NEWSBYTES, Sept. 19, 2000.  (In a letter to the Ninth Circuit, Sen. Orrin Hatch made it 
clear that Congress does not necessarily agree with the Justice Departments decision to 
support the recording industry in its legal attack against Napster, stating, [g]iven the 
importance of the issues to be decided, I think it important that the Court be under no 
misapprehension that the brief . . . necessarily expresses the views of the Congress in this 
matter.). 
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First Amendment rights that is going to say lets copy freely 
everything that might be available electronically, without regard to 
whether the creator gets paid or not.  Some of my co-panelists may 
disagree with that statement, but I have not heard that yet. 
So the real question now, I think, is not whether the copyright law 
as it presently stands prevents the use of video by people not 
authorized to use it.  The question is whether the law should be bent 
in order to allow the creators to realize some fair return for their 
work, as has been set out in the Constitution, versus the right of 
people to use these works in a way also contemplated by the 
Copyright Act. 
I guess the bottom line is that I agree with everybody here.  No, I 
do not mean that.  What I really mean is Chuck Sims makes a point: 
is it wrong to have a lock on creative material in the same way that 
you have a lock on your car?  And Marty and the others make a point 
when they say, But wait a minute, shouldnt we have the right to at 
least do some sort of excerpting for other constitutionally valid 
reasons? 
That is it. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  Jeff Cunard? 
MR. CUNARD:  I am actually not going to talk about DeCSS.68  
But I did want to show this slide to suggest that, in fact, DeCSS can 
be distributed in less sophisticated technological forms  namely on 
this T-shirt. It was partly the subject of trade-secret litigation 
regarding the unauthorized disclosure of DeCSS.69 
I am actually going to talk about something that has not yet been 
discussed, which is the iCraveTV case.70  I also want to talk about a 
couple of other things  search engines and technological measures 
 
 68   See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 69 See Steven Bonisteel, DVD-Cracking Lawsuit Targets T-Shirt-Borne Code, 
NEWSBYTES, Aug. 2, 2000 (Copyleft, a vendor of open-source software products, sells T-
shirts containing snippets of the source codes from the DVD-descrambling program, 
DeCSS.). 
 70 See National Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831 (W.D. Pa. 
2000). 
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to prevent unauthorized Internet retransmission of digital video and, 
potentially, other works. 
We represented one set of plaintiffs in the iCraveTV case: the 
sports leagues.71  The other main set of plaintiffs was the major 
motion picture studios.72 
When iCraveTV announced its business plan at the end of last 
year, it was a cover story on USA Today.73  It became a very, very 
important case.  Why was it so important, because it challenged the 
historic methods of distributing content on a territory-by-territory 
basis.74  iCraveTV took over-the-air television signals, in this case 
from WUTV, stored them on a server in Canada, and then 
retransmitted them over the Internet.75 
iCraveTV argued that such retransmission was permitted under 
Canadian copyright law, though it is not permitted under U.S. 
copyright law, and further argued that it had intended that the only 
viewers of the iCraveTV stream would be Canadians.76  To 
purportedly limit viewers to Canadians, iCraveTV asked that people 
supply some evidence that they were in fact located in Canada.77  
They could do so by typing in a three-digit Canadian area code, 
which was helpfully supplied on the Web site itself.78  iCraveTV was 
sued and a preliminary injunction was granted.79 
The case raises several interesting questions, none of which are 
matters of first impression: 
First, the question of whether infringing acts that originate outside 
the United States can be the subject of suit inside the United States.  
The judge held here that the public performance was in the United 
 
 71 See id. 
 72 See id. 
 73 Kevin Maney, Little Net Firm Rocks TV Giants Sending Channels on Web Awaits 
Court Ruling Today, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2000, at A1. 
 74 See Robert Cribb, New Company Puts TV Stations on Internet, CANADIAN PRESS 
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 29, 1999. 
 75 TVRadioNow, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1834. 
 76 See id. 
 77  See id. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id. at 1838. 
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States and, therefore, there was an infringing act in the United 
States.80  There had been an earlier case on that question, the Conus 
case,81 but the Internet brings to full front and center the question of 
asserting U.S. jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts of 
infringement. 
It was unquestioned that iCraveTV was both copying the programs 
in Canada and then streaming them into the United States.  It was 
interesting that the court relied on the Kirkwood case,82 an important 
Second Circuit case which we were also fortunate enough to be able 
to litigate. Kirkwood says, essentially, that program providers have 
control over the means and methods by which they distribute their 
programming  in that case, radio programming  electronically, 
by means of geographic segmentation.83 
iCraveTV has gone out of business. There is, however, a new 
company called JumpTV.com that has announced that it is going to 
start business from Canada very soon.84  They claim they have a 
foolproof method of making sure that the only people who access 
their Web site are Canadians.85  They use a technology called 
Border Control, which basically looks at your IP address and says: 
Your IP address suggests that you are coming from the United 
States.  Are you in fact coming from the United States?  Type in your 
domain name.86  So when I typed in yahoo.fr or a co.jp address, 
it determined that I in fact was not coming from the United States.  
So it is fairly easy to spoof a system that is based purely on an IP 
address. 
Another interesting lawsuit was filed earlier this year against 
RecordTV.com.87  This was a business that, with so-called one-click 
 
 80 See id. at 1836. 
 81 See generally Conus Communications Co. Ltd. Pship v. Hubbell, 2000 WL 979133 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 82 See generally Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 83 See id. at 111-12. 
 84 See generally Ed Hore, JumpTV Wants to Put TV Signals on the Internet, THE 
LAWYERS WEEKLY, Jan. 12, 2001. 
 85  See Hore, supra note 84. 
 86  See id. 
 87 See generally Movie and TV Studios File Copyright Suit Against Internet VCR Site, 
TELECOMMS. INDUS. LITIG. REP., Aug. 2000, at 8. 
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recording, streamed your favorite television program over the 
Internet.88  If you are not at your VCR, or you do not know how to 
program it, you use your Internet connection to connect to 
RecordTV.com and ask them to record the program for you.89  You 
just click to the program schedule, and the next time you log on you 
would be able to get access to the program that had been recorded.90 
In June, 2000, the major motion picture and media companies sued 
RecordTV.com, essentially based on some of the logic of the 
iCraveTV case.91  If you go to RecordTV.com today, you will see the 
following legend: This website is currently NOT showing any video 
while we resolve legal issues . . . If you wish to reach our legal 
counsel you may at . . .  The e-mail and Web site of the defendants 
counsel is helpfully provided.92 
I want to talk next about sharing.  I think sharing technology has 
been relegated probably to the next panel.  However, issues that 
apply to digital video apply to digital music, and vice-versa.  I think 
that everyone knows that sharing is not just an MP3 problem; it 
applies to movies, computer programs, books, and everything else 
now. 
The major movie studios and record labels believe that sharing is 
not a fair use.  They are very concerned about sharing  not just the 
centralized sharing scheme represented by Napster and Scour,93 but 
of course, also the peer-to-peer arrangements of Gnutella.94  
Obviously, one can search on a file-specific basis to look for video 
files and find file extensions of a certain sort, particularly .dvx.  If 
one went to Gnutella recently, one could find MISSION IMPOSSIBLE, 
EYES WIDE SHUT, BATTLEFIELD EARTH, and MISSION TO MARS. 
 
 88 See Paige Albiniak, Simon Says, Its Legal, BROADCASTING AND CABLE, May 29, 
2000 at 10. 
 89 See http://www.recordtv.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2001). 
 90 See id. 
 91 See Greg Miller, Entertainment Firms File Suit to Shut Down RecordTV.com, L.A. 
TIMES, June 16, 2000, at C1. 
 92 See supra note 89. 
 93 See generally Matt Richtel, Movie and Record Companies Sue a Film Trading Site, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2000, at C2. 
 94 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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Fundamental enforcement issues are raised by dispersed networks. 
These issues are, I think, useful to talk about.  A lawsuit was brought 
against Scour.com by movie studios and record companies.95  If one 
goes to Scour.com, one can gain access to both movies and records.96 
Finally, I want to talk about technological means of trying to 
address these problems.  Five companies have come up with Digital 
Transmission Content Protection (DTCP) technology.97  
Essentially, the idea behind DTCP is that content coming into the 
home from an external source will be protected through a licensed 
technology, which will have associated rules with respect to what 
can happen to the content.  One of the rules deals with how many 
copies one could potentially make.  Another rule states that the 
DTCP-protected content is not permitted to be sent to the Internet by 
DTCP-licensed products. 
DTCP is relevant because it suggests that questions of fair use, i.e., 
how many copies can be made, are not reasonably going to be set in 
the crucible of courts or Congress, but in the context of technology-
licensing discussions.  Importantly, however, DTCP relies on the 
DMCA because people who hack DTCP will find themselves on the 
other side of an anti-circumvention lawsuit. 
Thanks. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  Amazingly enough, we have actually 
preserved enough time for a good deal of discussion.  Perhaps we 
should let the panelists, if they want, very briefly make points that 




 95 See id. 
 96 Scour is a broadband Internet portal that allows people to download music, movies, e-
books, images, and documents.  See http://www.scour.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2001). 
 97 See generally Press Release, Intel, Digital Content Protection Solution Proposed by 
Leading Consumer Electronics, Computer Companies, Feb. 19, 1998 available at 
http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/con21998.htm (naming Hitachi, Intel, 
Matsushita (Panasonic), Sony, and Toshiba as the five companies responsible for 
developing the industry-wide standard). 
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MR. HERNSTADT:  I will make two quick points. 
One is when you were doing your PowerPoint presentation, you 
explained that the poster that you were using was fair use.  If you had 
taken that from a DVD, you would have violated the DMCA.  Your 
PowerPoint presentation, if you had used any images through a 
DVD, would have violated the DMCA, even though your fair use 
defense would have been perfectly valid. 
Interestingly enough, Michael Eisner,98 when he was making a 
presentation to Congress, took images from DVDs and did a 
PowerPoint presentation, because that is a very effective way of 
making a presentation without having to change DVDs every five 
seconds. 
I would like to just address one thing that Chuck said, which is this 
whole metaphor of the lock on the library and the lock on the fleet of 
cars.  That is completely misleading because CSS is not a lock on a 
library that prevents you from going in and borrowing a book.  You 
have bought the book.  It is like telling you that you can buy a book 
at a bookstore, but only use it in certain prescribed ways.  It 
essentially eliminates the notion of purchasing copyrighted materials 
on a particular medium that you own and control.  It makes it 
essentially solely a licensing arrangement. 
By buying a DVD and spending a lot of money for it, you can take 
it home, but you have the right only to view it.  You do not have the 
right to do anything else with it, which is different than any other 
copyrighted material. 
So when he says its the lock on the library, dont forget you own 
the libraryyou have purchased that DVD.  It is like you bought a 
book; it is like you bought a CD.99  You can take a CD home, you 
can take five seconds off the CD and put it on your answering 
machine.  You cannot do that with a DVD. 
 
 98 Michael Eisner has been the chairman and chief executive officer of The Walt Disney 
Company from 1984 to the present.  See http://disney.go.com/investors/earnings/q400.html 
(last visited Mar 4, 2001). 
 99 Compact Disc. 
PANEL II PP4 3/20/01  11:30 AM 
342 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:317 
 
MR. SIMS:  Well, you buy what you buy.  If you buy a book in 
French, that is what you have.  You may want it in English, but you 
do not have the right to commission and make available to the public 
an English translation.  If you buy it in French, the author has that 
right. 
MR. HERNSTADT:  That is correct, but you do have the right to 
make fair use of it. 
MR. SIMS:  You do, and anybody can make a fair use of any 
movie that is available. 
The key two words, it seems to me, to underline what Congress 
did and the choice it made are dumb machines.  These machines 
we are dealing with are dumb.  The point is not that Andrew cannot 
think of interesting things that would be nice to do with movies.  It is 
that the machines cannot distinguish between the Andrew Appels of 
the world and the Eric Corleys100 of the world or the mob pirates of 
the world.  The machines are dumb. 
And so, Congress had to decide whether the content owners were 
going to lose effective protection in order to protect and permit other 
uses, or whether by balancing, as Congress is entitled to do, it did not 
make sense to them to protect the incentives to creation (leaving the 
problem of other fair uses for future legislation or to be dealt with in 
other sorts of home remedy ways).  That is what Congress decided. 
I do not think the possibility of somebody indexing movies, which 
may not be available on VHS at some point in the future, is a reason 
for Congress to be forced to make a different choice than the one 
they made. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  It would be good now, I think, to 
invite people from the audience to weigh-in.  Perhaps we should start 
by focusing on the concern with fair use on one side, and the 
potential for loss of a tremendous source of revenues on the other, 
 
 100 Eric Corley is the founder of 2600: The Hacker Quarterly.  He is considered a leader 
in the computer hacker community, going by the alias Emmanuel Goldstein.  Corleys 
company, 2600 Enterprises, Inc., made DeCSS available for download from their website, 
www.2600.com.  See Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308-09. 
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and then maybe move from there to the constitutionality issue. 
PARTICIPANT [Stuart Rosen, Broadcast Music]:  Stu Rosen from 
BMI. 
Mr. Garbus, you said that the New York Times might be treated 
differently or be permitted to do things that your clients or other 
people could not.  You said they could link, while others could not.  
But you also said that they could analyze, report on, criticize, or 
discuss the code, while others cannot.  That is not my understanding 
of the decision.  Did I misunderstand you? 
MR. GARBUS:  No.  Lets assume that the Times and Corley 
wrote the exact same story and the story said that they are selling 
crack on 125th Street and somebody went out there and bought 
crack.  I think, under the interpretation of this case, Corley could be 
punished for it, but I do not think that the Times would be.  I think 
that he is making a distinction between different kinds of journalists 
with different motivations. 
In this case, Corley himself did not admit to downloading any 
film.101  He never was involved, so far as anyone knows, in any 
infringement of a film.  He did not make a nickel off a film.  So the 
standard tests that are used in contributory infringement of copyright 
cases are not met in this particular case. 
Now, what the court did was come up with a damage scheme.102  
By the way, relative to what Mr. Cunard said, if you go to the Disney 
search engines now, Infoseek103 or Northern Light,104 you will find 
the actual DeCSS code all over the place.  You will be sent to 
European sites; you will be sent to other sites. 
 
 
 101 See Reimerdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 314. 
 102 See id. at 343-46. 
 103 Infoseek, formerly found at http://www.infoseek.com, was purchased by The Walt 
Disney Company in November 1999 and merged into their GO.com service.  GO.com is an 
Internet portal focusing on entertainment, recreation and leisure content.  See 
http://www.go.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2001).  
 104 Northern Light is an Internet search engine, which claims to be the developer of the 
first research engine.  See http://www.northernlight.com/docs/about_company_mission 
.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2001). 
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PROFESSOR BENKLER:  U.S. sites. 
MR. GARBUS:  U.S. sites.  So another interesting issue is the 
efficacy of law.  That does not mean you should rip down the law, 
but it certainly raises a question of the extent to which the law 
becomes somewhat foolish. 
But getting back again to what you said, I think they set different 
standards for different kinds of media doing fundamentally the exact 
same things.  You can describe DeCSS without just describing the 
numbers; there are other ways of doing it. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  We had a question over there? 
PARTICIPANT [Steve Chaneles, Sportsline.com]:  My name is 
Steve Chaneles from Sportsline.com.105 
Most of the factual scenarios discuss the direct copying of a 
copyrighted work.  The question I have is: with the Internet and 
convergence of various media, where will the line be drawn as to 
whether or not something is copying a copyrighted work? 
Specifically in the sports context, many of you may have seen, in 
the media, that the NBA and the other professional leagues are taking 
their Web properties in-house.  Distinguish broadcast of a football 
game and, on the other hand, a graphical simulation of that event 
from factual data.  Is that a copying of the broadcast? 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  Different issue. 
PARTICIPANT [Mr. Chaneles]:  Or is that a creation from 
uncopyrighted material? 
MR. GARBUS:  I think that is a different issue.  That deals with 
whether intellectual property is transformative or derivative.  It 
seems to me it depends on how close it is to the original, et cetera. 
But let me mention something else in that context, which relates to 
what I was saying about public domain material and privately-owned 
 
 105 SportsLine.com is an Internet sports content portal.  See http://www.sportsline.com 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2001). 
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material.  Bill Gates has made this vast photographic library.106  That 
library basically distilled a great deal of public domain photography.  
Now he has bought the photographs, so he will then put out a DVD 
or a digitized book which will have all of these photographs on it, 
and the only way you will get to see them is if you have his book or 
sets of photographs.  The original copies of the photographs degrade 
quickly.  Digital material does not degrade.  So what you are then 
going to see is people buying his version, putting it on DVDs, 
encrypting, and selling it for a profit.  I mean, that is really one of the 
issues you have to deal with when you discuss this. 
MR. SIMS:  But if it is public domain, you can get it somewhere 
else. 
MR. GARBUS:  But not if he digitizes and has the copyright to the 
new digitized version. 
MR. SIMS:  You mean every copy? 
MR. GARBUS:  Exactly. 
MR. SIMS:  I am not aware that he is doing that.  It is true that he 
is buying one copy of lots of photographs. 
MR. GARBUS:  He is digitizing the photographs so that he has the 
sole and exclusive possession of the digitized versions of the 
photographs in this particular library. 
MR. SIMS:  But that is true of private collectors who own old 
medieval manuscripts. 
MR. GARBUS:  No, no, here he has a market of, lets say, 10-to-
20 million people to whom he markets something.  Public domain 
material becomes part of his marketing tool. 
MR. RUBIN:  But I do not think that implicates the copyright law.  
I do not see how it does.  If these public domain materials are out 
there and they are absolutely bought up, now you are talking about 
somebody who owns this collection. 
 
 106 See Jason Nisse & Andy Blackmore, Photo Finish: Gates and Getty in Battle for 
Planet Earth, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb 20, 2000, Business Section, at 1. 
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For example, I do not see that anybody has a right under the 
Copyright Act to decide that my bedroom furniture is really 
interesting and, therefore, has a right to go in and take a picture of it 
or make a drawing of it and take it out and use it to illustrate the way 
interior decorating works. 
MR. HERNSTADT:  I do not think that is what Marty is talking 
about.  Lets think of a different situation, where someone goes to 
caves near the Dead Sea and finds some scrolls.107  These are the 
only versions of certain books in the Bible that anyone has ever 
found, and they are absolutely unique in the world.  Lets say that 
they are public domain.  Someone takes them, transcribes them, puts 
them on a CD, and sells them.  You can do that.  But lets say they 
also put some kind of encryption device on it.  Scholars cannot 
access that material. 
One of the examples that Andrew raised in his submission to the 
Copyright Office on the rule-making procedure for the DMCA was: 
what if you want to access the text of William Shakespeare to find 
out the frequency of the use of two words in the same sentence?  
Well, scholars will not be able to do that with this new discovery, 
which is unique and in the sole control of a person who is entitled to 
make money from selling it. 
So, I think the Copyright Act is implicated in that they certainly 
have the right to sell it, and they certainly have the right to control 
the distribution of the materials they sell.  But I do not think they can 
sell it in a format that prevents fair use. 
PROFESSOR APPEL:  I think the difference between the picture 
of the bedroom furniture and the Bettmann Archives108 is that before 
these technological means came along, you either published 
something and contributed to the public discourse, or you did not.  If 
 
 107 The Dead Sea Scrolls are ancient documents found between 1947-56 in caves near 
the Dead Sea. The Scrolls are considered by scholars to have religious significance.  See 
http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/wsrp/educational_site/dead_sea_scrolls/ (last visited Feb 18, 
2001). 
 108 The Bettmann archive, also known as the Bettmann Collection, is a series of high-
quality stock photography owned by Corbis Corp.  See http://www.corbis.com/ 
corporate/press/background/default.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2001). 
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you published something and you contribute to the public discourse, 
then people have a right to respond and, after a certain limited term, 
they have the right to respond in very extensive ways because the 
copyright has expired.  We are losing this kind of public discourse. 
MR. SIMS:  That is just demonstrably not true.  There were all 
these movies. The reels were owned by whoever owned them.  And 
after the copyrights expired, nobody had a right to go in and seize 
them.  Every year in museums lovely paintings are lent by people.  
They then go on the block, and some of them get sold to other 
museums, which I am in favor of.  Some of them get sold to Swiss 
collectors, and we never see them again.  It makes me sad, but it is 
not a violation of the First Amendment or of fair use. 
MR. CUNARD:  We should, in thinking about this, preserve the 
distinction between the copy and the copyrighted work.  There is 
obviously a distinction between selling millions of DVDs that would 
be encrypted with CSS and pictures in a museum.  Eventually, 
movies would fall into the public domain.  The DMCA does not have 
a statute of limitations in the sense that devices permitting the 
implementation of technological measures are prohibited for all time, 
even if the works themselves are in the public domain.  So that 
essentially means that most people will, as a practical matter, be 
unable to access those works after they are out of copyright. 
The DMCA raises larger public-policy questions  not the subject 
of this discussion  about what to do about access to works where 
technological measures become obsolete.  Does one have to maintain 
all of the decrypting technologies that have ever been used by every 
copyright owner to get access to those works?  The need to do so 
raises, I think, a series of important questions for archives and 
libraries, one that I hope that the Copyright Office will address in its 
DMCA rulemaking. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  But there is also a specific issue that is 
raised here.  To what extent does our policy or the First Amendment 
relate to how we regulate the possibilities created by new 
technology? 
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The primary question with the Corbis database,109 some of which 
were public domain photographic works, has to do with whether or 
not law should prevent people from taking these digitized copies and 
making other uses of them.  It is not just a question of whether Bill 
Gates can charge people who want to get the service, but whether 
people can get around having to find an original copy and scan it in 
order to make their own digital copy simply to get the digitization.  
There the traditional answer might be: well, if it is a perfect copy 
that is just intended to represent accurately the original, maybe it is 
not original enough to have copyright protection.  Then we have the 
question of whether a database right would cover it and whether it 
would cover the public domain materials in it, et cetera. 
This goes to Chucks point about when I had to go to a movie 
theater to make a fair use of CINDERELLA.  The answer is that may 
well be true, but now we have new possibilities.  We have new 
possibilities of speaking effectively and criticizing effectively  for 
example, incorporating snippets of movies in a PowerPoint 
presentation or in a multimedia paper that we post on the Web as a 
new mode of publishing. 
The question is: How do we design the way that we use these new 
technologies?  Do we use the possibilities of fair use for more 
effective transformative use and criticism and communication, or do 
we not?  Fair use originally flowed from the impossibility of 
controlling a work after it was first sold.110  Now technology allows 
for greater control, the encryption and the possibility of licensing per 
use, something that was never technically possible before. 
So, legally we will enhance all the aspects of the technology that 
let owners control all valuable uses.  We will prohibit all aspects of 
the technology that allow for more effective utilization and 
manipulation of cultural products by the users of the cultural product.  
That is the policy choice. 
 
 
 109 See Nisse & Blackmore supra note 106. 
 110 See generally NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 13.05 (covering the history and parameters 
of the fair use defense). 
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So, it is not good enough to say that we were able to do only one 
thing in the past; therefore, it is good enough to do that same thing in 
the future. 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Jane Ginsburg, Columbia Law 
School]:  Jane Ginsburg, Columbia Law School. 
The first thing I want to specify is that I do not have DeCSS on my 
Web site.  I merely link to DeCSS. 
I think that I would like to elaborate on this last discussion because 
I think there are two different issues, and they should be kept clear. 
One is the fair use question, which might be characterized  
elaborating on what you just said, Yochai  as whether Congress 
correctly struck the balance between protecting copyright owners 
(who are afraid of some of the possibilities of this new media) as 
against the enhanced convenience of fair use through the new media. 
We are not talking  at least not unless we get some lock-up, 
which is an issue too  we are not talking about being unable to 
engage in these activities.  Rather, we are talking about not being 
able to do them in the most convenient fashion.  I think that is an 
important issue.  I am not voicing an opinion as to where the balance 
is.  I just think it should be clear that the balance is what we are 
talking about. 
Two, lock-up.  The Bettmann Archives111 is an interesting 
example, because there seem to be some thoughts about what access 
we had in the old days that may not be entirely correct.  If you take 
the Bettmann Archives, as Jeffrey said, the owner of those 
photographs controls the copy, and by controlling the copy may be 
able to control reproduction.  Maybe it is licensed to the newspaper 
with the restriction that you can reproduce it only at X level of 
quality, which makes its further reproduction not very worthwhile.  
So, in effect, a copy is made available for reproduction, but not in a 
way that competes with the owners exploitation of this admittedly 
public domain work.  But it is an incursion on access of some sort 
through control of the visible copy. 
 
 111 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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Now lets take Corbis, which is going to digitize the Bettmann 
Archives.112  Those works are still in the public domain, but now 
they are released in a form that may make it easy to copy at a quality 
that would be comparable with the original.  So will you be able to 
lock that up against further copying by means of a now legally 
protected technical device? 
I think that Jeffrey might have slightly misstated the DMCA to the 
extent that there is a time limit.  It is the same time limit as 
copyright.  The DMCA protects only against the circumvention of an 
access protection guarding a work falling under this title.113  So if 
you access-protect a public domain photograph, you cannot 
circumvent that access. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  What do you do with the anti-device 
provision, though? 
MR. HERNSTADT:  Right, that is the problem. 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Ginsburg]:  You cannot circumvent 
that protection. 
But now Corbis might say, Ah, but I have a compilation of 
photographs and the compilation is a work protected by copyright, or 
the scholarly introduction I append to all of these public domain 
photographs is a work protected by copyright.  So the whole thing is 
protected, even if the individual components are not.  And you 
cannot get to the individual components unless you circumvent the 
whole thing.  That is the lock-up problem. 
That is a problem that was called to the Copyright Offices 
attention by a lot of people during the hearing process, and we will 
see the fruits of that in a couple of weeks. 
I think that there is an issue about putting on a copyrighted veneer 
over a public domain document that does have to be dealt with.  But 
I think that one should not equate the fair use problem with the 
digital lock-up problem.  The fact that this is a highly convenient, 
 
 112 See id.  See also http://www.corbis.com/corporate/press/releases/content_default/ 
prfiles/PR4%5F24%5F00.htm (last visited Mar 4, 2001). 
 113 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1998). 
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highly manipulable format from which it may be very desirable to do 
lots of things does not mean that it is the only format. 
So, I think one ought to be evaluating what are the pros and cons 
of transposing the familiar fair use to this more convenient format.  
Is convenience the overriding argument for fair use if there are 
reasonable alternatives?  That is just another way of stating the 
policy choice. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  Let me just get you to elaborate a little 
bit. Andrew raised issues that were not about convenience.  They 
were about new types of learning that could only be achieved 
because of the unique manipulability of a particular medium.  So 
there are issues  and those are the ones that Chuck, I think, was 
focusing on  that have to do with convenience in a broad sense: 
quality of reproduction, for example, VHS versus DVD. 
But there are certain aspects  and I think Andrew gave the 
examples  that have to do with unique new learning and speech 
possibilities created by the digital medium that are not available in 
any other medium. What do you do with those? 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Ginsburg]:  Well, he said you could 
hire a student to watch hundreds of hours of films.  There are 
probably some students who would happily volunteer for that task.  
But I recognize that it is not very appealing to say you have to spend 
all this extra time and money doing things the old way, given that 
there is now a new way that the copyright owner is thwarting. 
I think it is an interesting question whether there may be access to 
unprotected copies for various scholarly uses.  It has been proposed 
that the Library of Congress should be the place that you could 
always go to if you wanted to do exactly what Andrew wants to do.  
Now, librarians tend not to be really enthusiastic about that.  They do 
not really want to be the keepers of the fair-use flame.  But it is an 
interesting question, how you accommodate these differences. 
There is, in the DMCA, an exception for security testing.114  Now, 
some people are not happy with that exception because they feel it is 
 
 114 See 17 U.S.C. 1201(j). 
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not open enough.  You have to be kind of an official security tester.  
Therefore, if you are not an official security tester within a 
recognized institution (and all the other criteria that are in the 
statute), you just have to be very good at breaking into things and 
showing people the weakness in their system.  You are barred by that 
provision. 
But, I think that was an attempt to balance those who have a bona 
fide research and new fair use-type argument with the concern that it 
is a slippery slope.  If you have no limits as to who is entitled to do 
this, whether it be a recognized institution or something, then you 
may well not have any prohibition at all. 
So I guess, to some extent, one of the policy questions is the 
concern today that technological protections have swallowed fair 
use.  The concern on the other end is that fair use is the tail that is 
going to wag the dog.  And fair use is going to end up swallowing 
whatever copyright protection is left because there are no adequate 
lines drawn. 
Somebody is going to be unhappy either way.  I do not think 
anybody, even those who passionately believe in all those rights, 
thinks that the DMCA was a model of anything favorable.  But 
nonetheless, I think that the policy choices do need to take account of 
the enhancements, but also recognize that there is an awful lot of 
potential for pretense. 
That is also the problem that Judge Kaplan was confronting in his 
distinction between the Los Angeles Times and 2600.com.115  The 
suggestion was that maybe the L.A. Times would have a stronger 
First Amendment claim than does somebody who claims to be 
performing an act of civil disobedience while eluding a previous 
court order. 116  So there is a spectrum. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  Jeffrey? 
 
 
 115 Reimerdes II, 111 F.Supp. 2d at 294. 
 116 See id. 
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MR. CUNARD:  I just wanted to say that your article on the Free 
Republic case,117 Professor Benkler, focuses on the conduct-device 
distinction, which was one of the critical distinctions that Congress 
focused on when it was considering this legislation.  There was an 
enormous amount of concern in Congress about fair uses being 
overridden, and there was a last-minute negotiated resolution to have 
the Copyright Office conduct this study.  There were a number of 
people who thought that the DMCA itself could have been held up 
had people pressed very, very hard to get a fair use right into Section 
1201(a)(1).118 
The real issue, though, is that the average librarian or other fair 
user cannot really break an effective technological measure by 
himself or herself, absent a device.  This reality raised the question of 
how to define a device that could be made available only for fair 
uses, or for perhaps some of the other exceptions that are set out in 
the DMCA, but not for other uses.  The effort to craft a fair use 
exception for devices ran aground because it proved very hard to 
identify precisely the purposes and functions of a device that would 
be available only to pick locks legitimately, as opposed to 
illegitimately. 
MR. GARBUS:  Was there an awareness that it might not be 
possible to find such a technology? 
MR. CUNARD:  Well, I think it was possible to develop such 
technologies.  The question is whether one could define them in the 
statute rigorously enough.  In other words, could one authorize some 
tools for legitimate breaking and entering  in other words, to allow 
me to get into my own house, where I have a right to get into my 
house  but prevent those same tools from being made available to 
 
 117 Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999). 
 118 Senator Leahy remarked that, in view of the inability of the Conference on Fair Use 
(CONFU) to agree on guidelines for applying fair use to digital distance learning, all 
members on this Committee are as anxious as I am to complete the process that we started 
in Committee of updating the Copyright Act to permit the appropriate use of copyrighted 
works in valid distance learning activities.  This step should be viewed as a beginning-not an 
end, and we are committed to reaching that end point as quickly as possible.  See S. REP. 
NO. 105-190 at 65, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
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the unauthorized lock-picker.  That was a very, very difficult 
problem, and, ultimately, it influenced the final approach to 
1201(a)(1).119 
PROFESSOR APPEL:  I must say that I am pessimistic about the 
technological prospects, for being able to draw these lines 
technologically.  So, in fact, the very last slide that you presented had 
a little X somewhere.  It let things onto the screen but not onto the 
Internet.  It is not clear that really is going to work.  If you can see it 
on your screen, somehow you have got something. 
So, there may be ways to circumvent it.  It is going to be very hard 
to prevent this circumvention, except through these very heavy-
handed legal means.  So, I do not think that anything is going to 
jump out of a machine and provide a technological solution to these 
problems.  We will just have to discuss them as we are discussing 
them. 
MR. CUNARD:  A ten-second amplification on that.  The X on 
my slide, to illustrate that content protected by DTCP is not 
permitted to be output to the Internet, was intended to reflect the fact 
that the license for the DTCP technology states that a product using 
that technology may not send protected content out to the Internet.  
So, if someone has a licensee of this technology and makes a product 
that sends protected content onto the Internet, product manufacturers 
could be sued for breaching the terms of the license. 
If someone else comes along and hacks that product, which you 
are suggesting could be likely, there is little, contractually, that could 
be done about it.  But the DMCA might be available.  The license 
has various provisions as to how robust the implementation of the 
technology has to be to be hacker-proof, to the extent possible, 
with obligations to distribute upgrades and the like if the 
implementation is hacked. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  But, I thought that was actually a 
fabulous slide and very useful.  One of the things that I saw there, 
particularly that little X to the Internet, is the need of the movie 
 
 119 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-551 (II), at 39 (1998). 
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and the recording industries, which rely on control of instances of 
individual copies and collection of rent for access to those copies.  
That requires a hermetically-sealed system.  Wherever there is 
leakage, there is potential for that entire model to unravel. 
So, it seems to me that the policy choice is not just a question of 
convenience-versus-incentives.  It is the question of whether we will, 
with law, make sure that our cultural goods operate in a hermetically-
sealed environment (where the producer has to control every aspect, 
from the moment of production to every instance of consumption, in 
order to retain the viability of the business model).  That has never 
been done. 
It is not a balance that is the traditional balance.  And when you 
are thinking not about First Amendment doctrine, but about the 
concept of how we use our culture, think about movies and texts, and 
our ability to talk about our environment, making an institutional 
choice whose endpoint is a hermetically-sealed system may not be 
the smartest thing.  Maybe we should create the legal incentives for 
the producers to come up with more robust business models rather 
than something that relies on hermetic control from end-to-end of 
every single use of the product. 
PROFESSOR APPEL:  Let me comment on that briefly.  If I shoot 
something with my video camera, I can give you the videotape.  If I 
record something with my garage band, I can give you the cassette.  
This works because you have the tape player or the VCR.  But when 
Mr. Sims said that we can show the VHS in our classroom because 
the VHS will always continue to exist along with the DVD, well, we 
also have the right to show the Betamax version in our classroom. 
As we evolve towards this hermetically-sealed mechanism, a lot of 
the proposed technological mechanisms for distribution of content do 
not actually allow you to put a home-recorded, self-shot home video 
into the player and have it play.  And so now the only things that will 
play on your player are the commercial ones.  Non-commercial 
speech will be technologically prevented because most people will 
not bother to have two players, one that can play the licensed 
commercial discs, and one that can play a video that their friend 
made. 
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MR. CUNARD:  That may be true of technologies in the future.  It 
is not true of CSS or DTCP.  People may choose to insert codes to 
signal that they want their content copy-protected.  One could author 
a homemade DVD disk when there are DVD recorders, and not use 
CSS, and the disk should play back perfectly well. 
PROFESSOR APPEL:  Well, let me give a specific example.  A 
professor of music at Princeton edited a CD and wrote it onto a CD 
disc using a computer.  He sent it to my colleague, a professor of 
computer science, who put it into his DVD player (which can also 
play audio CDs) and it said no disc.  The reason is that he wrote it 
to a disc that is not enabled to play on CSS-equipped DVD players 
because one bit is not written to the disc somewhere.  This is a 
protection mechanism.  It is not the CSS protection; it is a different 
one.  It does not involve encryption at all.  It is meant to control the 
unlicensed piracy of content.  But it has had the effect, literally, of 
preventing communications by individuals of their own creative 
works. 
MR. HERNSTADT:  I would like to add something in light of 
what Professors Benkler and Ginsburg said.  You are cautioning that 
we not look at fair use as the end-all and be-all, that it might swallow 
too much, because what you are looking at is not the most 
convenient, rather than no possible use. 
I do not think that is entirely accurate, and I think in the big picture 
it is going to become less and less accurate.  There are certain 
materials that are unique to DVD, that you cannot find on VHS.  
This is apart from the reality that not convenient translates for 
some people to impossible. 
But setting that aside, there are materials on DVD discs that are 
designed and appear only on DVD discs, and that is one of the 
advertising tools that they use in selling you the DVDs, that you get 
all this special material. 
Increasingly  at least, this is what we learned in the case  
materials are going to be released only on DVD and not alternative 
formats.  I think that because the DMCA is about controlling access 
to content, that is going to be particularly true.  If you can control the 
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access to content by putting a protective measure around it, the 
content owners are going to do that.  And, increasingly in the future, 
you are going to find a situation where the only alternative, or the 
only place you can find certain copyrighted materials, is on a 
medium or in a format that is content-protected, and the DMCA will 
apply. 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Ginsburg]:  I think that is what the 
Copyright Office said the three-year global study is supposed to be 
for. 
MR. GARBUS:  But one assumes how the Copyright Office will 
come out.  In other words, one assumes that the situation that Ed just 
described will be so  namely, that everything will be on DVDs and 
that everything will be protected, and the Copyright Office will not 
interfere with that. 
MR. HERNSTADT:  And moreover, I think, we are talking about 
fair use.  If you think about fair use in one way, because you are 
considering it as opposed to one more convenient and one less 
convenient way, you might devalue fair use, as compared to when 
you think about it as the only alternative. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  Maybe we could use the last few 
minutes to talk more specifically on the First Amendment side of this 
problem.  I would like to propose to everyone that there are really 
two independent types of First Amendment arguments here.  One has 
to do with the fact that computer scientists are speakers of a certain 
set of languages, called computer languages, and that their rights to 
communicate about what they do are constrained by this particular 
form.  That is one set of concerns that limits the speech of one subset 
of people. 
Then, there is another set of concerns, and that has to do with, in a 
sense, side effects on technically unsophisticated people.  One of the 
fascinating things about Judge Kaplans opinion is that it explicitly 
said Congress decided to make fair use of digital materials 
unavailable to technically unsophisticated people, which presumably 
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is most people here.120 
There is an effect on the way that people can use video materials if 
they are not technically sophisticated that is implicated by this 
balance  call it lack of convenience, call it lack of availability  
not for computer scientists, but for everyone. 
I think the correct First Amendment understanding is that 
Congress is clearly trying to do something valuable.  They are trying 
to make sure that there are incentives for production. 
The question is: are there less restrictive ways?  That is the 
appropriate question that should be asked.  Are there less restrictive 
ways of serving  less convenient, if you will  ways for the 
copyright owners, but nonetheless less restrictive means of helping 
copyright owners appropriate the value of what they produce that 
would not be so restrictive as to users rights? 
MR. SIMS:  Number one, I think that is the wrong question, 
because when Congress is acting in furtherance of constitutional 
powers that it has, it is not subject to less-restrictive-means analysis. 
It should not be and cannot be.  I think the question is also wrong 
because it assumes . . . 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  Are you suggesting that media 
regulation is not based on a congressional power? 
MR. SIMS:  No. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  All actions of Congress are based on 
congressional power. 
MR. SIMS:  Congress could have set up the national television 
system having all the wires be common carriers, or they could have 
set it up the way they did.  There are areas like that where Congress 
is entitled to make choices, and, because they are essentially 
economic choices and choices under the Commerce Clause121  
although, clearly, there is some First Amendment analysis  it is a 
less rigorous, less strict analysis.  I think this is, as Judge Kaplan 
 
 120 See Reimerdes II, 111 F.Supp. 2d at 294. 
 121 See U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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clearly thought, that kind of case.122 
The other thing is that Judge Kaplan found  and I think properly 
 that, at least for the foreseeable present, the notion that there are 
meaningful restrictions on anybodys speech is simply totally not 
proven.123  Computer scientists, such as Andrew, can talk to each 
other to their hearts content.  They can describe the problems with 
certain kinds of security systems. 
What they cannot do, and what Corley cannot do, and what 
nobody can do, is provide to the public the encryption keys that kill 
the protection altogether.  Even though one person wants to do that, 
and one person might have a good reason for doing that, that causes 
such harm that Congress concluded in its legislative power, 
consistent with the First Amendment, that those kinds of technical 
measures ought to be allowable.  Similarly, because I am a lawyer, 
and I work seventy-eighty hours a week, I cannot use the public 
library the way I want to use it.  It happens to be closed when I want 
to use it. 
But we have rules for other purposes, and they are not invalid just 
because particular people can be found to say that violates my First 
Amendment rights. 
MR. GARBUS:  That is a different issue. 
PROFESSOR BENKLER:  We have to close.  Thank you to the 
panel. 
MR. PENNISI:  I want to give a hearty thank you to our video 
panelists, our moderator, and audience. 
 
 122 See Remeirdes II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 335. 
 123 See id. at 339.   
